Live talk / Discutie in direct

Monday, 16th of January , I will be available all day to discuss implications from the recent S&P decisions.
Luni, 16 Ianaurie, va stau la dispozitie toata ziua sa discutam implicatiile deciziilor S&P.

Please send your questions either to my personal mail or on my blog
Va rog sa trimiteti intrebarile pe adresa de e-mail personala or pe blog la

Standard & Poor’s Takes Various Rating Actions On 16 Eurozone Sovereign Governments
Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 16:36:27 EST
View Analyst Contact Information

In our view, the policy initiatives taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone.
We are lowering our long-term ratings on nine eurozone sovereigns and affirming the ratings on seven.
The outlooks on our ratings on all but two of the 16 eurozone sovereigns are negative. The ratings on all 16 sovereigns have been removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).

FRANKFURT (Standard & Poor’s) Jan. 13, 2012–Standard & Poor’s Ratings
Services today announced its rating actions on 16 members of the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU or eurozone) following completion of its

We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by
two notches; lowered the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta,
Slovakia, and Slovenia, by one notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
All ratings have been removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first
placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).

. See list below for full details on the affected ratings.

The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Spain are negative, indicating that we believe that there is at
least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be lowered in 2012 or 2013.
The outlook horizon for issuers with investment-grade ratings is up to two
years, and for issuers with speculative-grade ratings up to one year. The
outlooks on the long-term ratings on Germany and Slovakia are stable.

We assigned recovery ratings of ‘4’ to both Cyprus and Portugal, in accordance
with our practice to assign recovery ratings to issuers rated in the
speculative-grade category, indicating an expected recovery of 30%-50% should
a default occur in the future.

Today’s rating actions are primarily driven by our assessment that the policy
initiatives that have been taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may
be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In
our view, these stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an
increase in risk premiums for a widening group of eurozone issuers, (3) a
simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and households, (4) weakening
economic growth prospects, and (5) an open and prolonged dispute among
European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges.

The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers, lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone’s financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the eurozone’s core and the so-called “periphery”. As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks
becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers’
rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national
tax revenues.

Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted
downward our political scores (one of the five key factors in our criteria)
for those eurozone sovereigns we had previously scored in our two highest
categories. This reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of European policymaking and political institutions have not
been as strong as we believe are called for by the severity of a broadening
and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.

In our view, it is increasingly likely that refinancing costs for certain
countries may remain elevated, that credit availability and economic growth
may further decelerate, and that pressure on financing conditions may persist.
Accordingly, for those sovereigns we consider most at risk of an economic
downturn and deteriorating funding conditions, for example due to their large
cross-border financing needs, we have adjusted our external score downward.

On the other hand, we believe that eurozone monetary authorities have been
instrumental in averting a collapse of market confidence. We see that the
European Central Bank has successfully eased collateral requirements, allowing
an ever expanding pool of assets to be used as collateral for its funding
operations, and has lowered the fixed rate to 1% on its main refinancing
operation, an all-time low. Most importantly in our view, it has engaged in
unprecedented repurchase operations for financial institutions, greatly
relieving the near-term funding pressures for banks. Accordingly we did not
adjust the initial monetary score on any of the 16 sovereigns under review.

Moreover, we affirmed the ratings on the seven eurozone sovereigns that we
believe are likely to be more resilient in light of their relatively strong
external positions and less leveraged public and private sectors. These credit
strengths remain robust enough, in our opinion, to neutralise the potential
ratings impact from the lowering of our political score.

However, for those sovereigns with negative outlooks, we believe that downside
risks persist and that a more adverse economic and financial environment could
erode their relative strengths within the next year or two to a degree that in
our view could warrant a further downward revision of their long-term ratings.

We believe that the main downside risks that could affect eurozone sovereigns
to various degrees are related to the possibility of further significant
fiscal deterioration as a consequence of a more recessionary macroeconomic
environment and/or vulnerabilities to further intensification and broadening
of risk aversion among investors, jeopardizing funding access at sustainable
rates. A more severe financial and economic downturn than we currently
envisage (see “Sovereign Risk Indicators”, published Dec. 28, 2011) could also
lead to rising stress levels in the European banking system, potentially
leading to additional fiscal costs for the sovereigns through various bank
workout or recapitalization programs. Furthermore, we believe that there is a
risk that reform fatigue could be mounting, especially in those countries that
have experienced deep recessions and where growth prospects remain bleak,
which could eventually lead us to the view that lower levels of predictability
exist in policy orientation, and thus to a further downward adjustment of our
political score.

Finally, while we currently assess the monetary authorities’ response to the
eurozone’s financial problems as broadly adequate, our view could change as
the crisis and the response to it evolves. If we lowered our initial monetary
score for all eurozone sovereigns as a result, this could have negative
consequences for the ratings on a number of countries.

In this context, we would note that the ratings on the eurozone sovereigns
remain at comparatively high levels, with only three below investment grade
(Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece). Historically, investment-grade-rated
sovereigns have experienced very low default rates. From 1975 to 2010, the
15-year cumulative default rate for sovereigns rated in investment grade was
1.02%, and 0.00% for sovereigns rated in the ‘A’ category or higher. During
this period, 97.78% of sovereigns rated ‘AAA’ at the beginning of the year
retained their rating at the end of the year.

Following today’s rating actions, Standard & Poor’s will issue separate media
releases concerning affected ratings on the funds, government-related
entities, financial institutions, insurance companies, public finance, and
structured finance sectors in due course.


Sovereign Government Rating Methodology And Assumptions, June 30, 2011
Criteria For Determining Transfer And Convertibility Assessments, May 18, 2009
Introduction Of Sovereign Recovery Ratings, June 14, 2007


Standard & Poor’s Puts Ratings On Eurozone Sovereigns On CreditWatch With Negative Implications, Dec. 5, 2011
Trade Imbalances In The Eurozone Distort Growth For Both Creditors And Debtors, Says Report, Dec. 1, 2011
Standard & Poor’s RPM Measures The Eurozone’s Great Rebalancing Act, Nov. 21, 2011
Who Will Solve The Debt Crisis?, Nov. 10, 2011
Ireland’s Prospects Amidst The Eurozone Credit Crisis, Nov. 29, 2011

To From
Austria (Republic of) AA+/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+
Belgium (Kingdom of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
AA/Negative/A-1+ AA/Watch Neg/A-1+
Cyprus (Republic of) BB+/Negative/B BBB/Watch Neg/A-3
Estonia (Republic of) AA-/Negative/A-1+ AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+
Finland (Republic of) AAA/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+
France (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
AA+/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+
Germany (Federal Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
AAA/Stable/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+
Ireland (Republic of) BBB+/Negative/A-2 BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2
Italy (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
BBB+/Negative/A-2 A/Watch Neg/A-1
Luxembourg (Grand Duchy of) AAA/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+
Malta (Republic of) A-/Negative/A-2 A/Watch Neg/A-1
Netherlands (The) (State of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
AAA/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+
Portugal (Republic of) BB/Negative/B BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Slovak Republic A/Stable/A-1 A+/Watch Neg/A-1
Slovenia (Republic of) A+/Negative/A-1 AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+
Spain (Kingdom of) A/Negative/A-1 AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+
N.B.–This does not include all ratings affected.

Standard & Poor’s will hold a teleconference on Saturday Jan. 14, 2012 at 3:00
PM UK time. The teleconference can be accessed live or via replay and by phone
or audio internet streaming

The call will begin promptly at 3:00 p.m.

Passcode: 2705831
For security reasons, the passcode will be required to join the call.

Country Toll Numbers Freephone/Toll Free Number
AUSTRIA 43-1-92-80-003 0800-677-861
BELGIUM 32-1-150-0312 0800-4-9471
DENMARK 45-7014-0239 8088-2100
ESTONIA 800-011-1121
FINLAND 106-33-149 0800-1-12771
FRANCE 33-1-70-75-25-35 080-563-9909
GERMANY 49-69-2222-3198 0800-101-6627
GREECE 30-80-1-100-0674 00800-12-6609
IRELAND 353-1-247-5274 1800-992-870
ITALY 39-02-3601-0953 800-985-849
LUXEMBOURG 352-27-000-1351 8002-9058
NETHERLANDS 31-20-718-8530 0800-023-4392
PORTUGAL 8008-12439
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 421-2-322-422-16
SPAIN 34-91-414-40-78 800-098-194
UNITED KINGDOM 44-20-7950-6551 0800-279-3590
USA 1-210-795-1143 866-297-1588

Call notes: This call is to be recorded for Instant Replay purposes
UK TOLL #: +44-20-7108-6279
UK TOLL FREE #: 0800-376-9027

The instant replay will start at: Jan. 14, 2012 5:30pm UKT
The instant replay will end at: Feb-14-2012 11:59pm UKT

Passcode for replay: 7498
Restrictions may exist when accessing freephone/toll free numbers using a
mobile telephone.

To join the event:
Conference number: 1297498
Passcode: 2705831

To access the Audio Replay of this call, all parties can:
1. Go to the URL listed above.
2. Choose Audio Streaming under Join Events.
3. Enter the conference number and passcode. (Note that if this is a recurring
event, multiple dates may be listed.)
Replays are available for 30 days after the live event.

This unsolicited rating(s) was initiated by Standard & Poor’s. It may be based
solely on publicly available information and may or may not involve the
participation of the issuer. Standard & Poor’s has used information from
sources believed to be reliable based on standards established in our Credit
Ratings Information and Data Policy but does not guarantee the accuracy,
adequacy, or completeness of any information used.

Complete ratings information is available to subscribers of RatingsDirect on
the Global Credit Portal at All ratings affected
by this rating action can be found on Standard & Poor’s public Web site at Use the Ratings search box located in the left
column. Alternatively, call one of the following Standard & Poor’s numbers:
Client Support Europe (44) 20-7176-7176; London Press Office (44)
20-7176-3605; Paris (33) 1-4420-6708; Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-225; Stockholm
(46) 8-440-5914; or Moscow 7 (495) 783-4009.

Primary Credit Analyst: Moritz Kraemer, Frankfurt (49) 69-33-99-9249;
Secondary Contact: Frank Gill, London (44) 20-7176-7129;


26 thoughts on “Live talk / Discutie in direct

  1. buna ziua,
    m-ar interesa ce risc de contagiune s-ar manifesta asupra sitemului bancar romanesc ( in special bancile cu actionariat grecesc de la noi ) in cazul unui defalut ( controlat sau nu ) al greciei si chiar al bancilor mama de acolo ?

    1. @mike
      Acest risc a existat din primul moment din care pietele financiare au realizat ca Grecia nu va putea sa-si plateasca datoriile publice. Exista doua scenarii extreme pentru bancile cu capital grecesc din Romania: preluarea de stat sau bail-out. Totusi, bancile respective ar putea sa evite aceste scenarii prin acceptarea pierderilor din bilant si/sau vanzarea de active neperformante. Acest lucru este valabil pentru tot sistemul financiar bancar european care pentru a merge mai departe are nevoie de curatarea bilantului.

      Totul depinde acum de cum vor reactiona atat bancile cat si politicile economice. Pana acum atat bancile cat si polticienii din zona euro au reactiona lent la o realitate dramatica a zonei euro.

    1. @Dan
      Orice influenta se va vedea doar in costul creditelor noi. Teoretic intr-un mediu competitiv nu ar trebui sa vedem o crestere a dobanzilor la credite, atat in lei cat si in valuta, deoarece bancile ar putea reduce marja care se aplica la fiecare credit peste costul de finantare atat in euro cat si in lei.
      Totusi avand in vedere sistemul oligopolistic din piata bancara cred cadobanzile la creditele viitoare in euro o fie mai mari.
      Pentru creditele in lei depinde foarte mult de reactia BNR.
      Ca sa nu vedem cresteri ale dobanzilor in lei este nevoie ca BNR sa introduca lichiditate in sistemul interbancar la scadente mai marie: pana la un an. Prin aceasta injectie de lichiditate BNR nu relaxeaza politica monetara dar face functionala piata interbancara folostita de banci pentru finantarea activelor pe termen lung in lei.

  2. Scaderea ratingului SUA nu a produs miscari ample si de durata in pietele financiare, desi se prezicea Apocalipsa. De ce acum e mai grav?

    Urmeaza scaderea ratingului bancilor din tarile retrogradate? Ce inseamna asta pentru Romania?

    1. @Ionut
      Nu ne aflam in aceasi sitautie. SUA printeaza propria moneda pe cand Franta, Austria etc depind de ECB. Mai mult in zona euro discutam de politici fiscale independente, de sisteme politice independente, de tari suverane ceea ce face situatia mai greu de inteles si creste riscurile unor decizii in intersul national dar in detrimentul zonei euro.

      DA, cred ca pasul urmator este reducerea ratingului bancilor cu capital din tarile retrogradate. In Romania efectul principal (negativ) se va cvedea asupra cresterii economice.Singura snasa este sa gasim surse de finantare/investii interna(e) si sa crestem productivitatea.

  3. de ce bancile prefera sa depuna banii la BCE dupa ce au luat imprumuturile de sute de miliarde? De ce nu dau drumul creditarii?

    1. @Nea Vasile
      Bancile prefera sa finanteze pe termen scurt statele din zona euro si restul banilor sa-l depuna la BCE in depozite. Fiind in centrul eocnomiei bancile sunt primele care stiu ca premizele cresterii eocnomice in zona euro sunt afectate negative. In aceste conditii riscul de faliment -personal sau al unei corporatii – creste si astfel scade apetitul de creditare al bancilor. Bancile vor credita economiile din nou dupa ce vor vedea semmne clare de crestere economica.

    1. @Stefan Balica
      If the response of EU leader will be similar to what has already been put forward so far , yes. The other rating agencies will wait a little bit but if things do not get resolved in the first quarter of 2012 then they will have to take action. The risk is that they will once again react too late .
      Nevertheless, we will see comments from them soon, either supporting the S&P decision or saying that they are still assessing the situation.

  4. in cat timp credeti ca se vor elimina presiunile deflationiste datorita datoriilor suverane si in consecinta va putea fi reluata cresterea economica mondiala ?

    1. @Mike
      Este greu sa ai crestere economica fara investitii. Atata timp cat capitalul va fi folosit pentru finatarea datoriilor publice si mentinerea pe linia de plutire a bancilor, investitiile private nu vor creste. Cineva, undeva trebuie sa accepte o pierdere. toata lumea se uita la Grecia dar eu cred ca mai exista o tara sau doua care vor cere o reducere a datoriei publice de la investitori.
      Dar pe langa ceea ce se vede, i.e. Grecia, eu cred ca vom vedea si in secotrul pirvat bancar o banca sau dau care vor fi trecute in proprietatea unui stat. Secotrul privat va trebui sa accepte ca a facut cateva investitii proaste.

  5. Cum credeti ca vor evolua valutele Leu/Dolar/Euro/CHF pe parcursul anului daca vor mai fi si alte scaderi ale ratingului tarilor europene(sau de ce nu si al SUA)?

    1. @gigel
      Dupa cum am mai spus cred ca USD si activele denominate in USD o sa fie cele mai performante anul acesta.
      Cred ca CHF s-ar putea sa schimbe pragul EURCHF 1.15 in loc de 1.2, cel putin pt o perioada (daca situatia din EU nu se rezolva).
      RON, ca si restul regiunii, are sanse mare sa ajunga la noi maxime, primul o sa fie la 4.4. Intodeauna pentru RON exista riscul de interventie al BNR dar in 2012 este nevoie de o dobanda mica de finantare a datoriei publice. Asadar cred ca BNR va interveni dar nu va steriliza in totalitate aceste interventii.

  6. dar problema asta , cu datoriile , nu se poate rezolva mai “elegant” prin inflatie , asa cum se incearca in America ? pana la urma ce sanse ar fi sa avem in consecinta o inflatie mondiala generalizata in viitorul apropiat ?

    1. @Mike
      Nu stiu daca este mai elegant dar este o solutie. Din pacate sau din fericire, depinde de unde privesti. ECB are un obiectiv calr de mentinere a cresterii preturilor la sau sub 2% pe an. Deprecierea EUR este o alta solutie, pe langa recunoasterea pierderilor in bilant, sa vedem daca va accepta zona euro asa ceva.

  7. Ce efecte pe termen lung vor avea incidentele de aseara si probabil cele care vor mai urma + lipsa reactiilor din partea reprezentatiior statului roman asupra:

    – modului in care este privita tara noasta la nivel mondial
    – investitiilor straine in RO


    Ce solutii de iesire din aceasta criza politica exista in momentul de fata, care sa fie in acord cu interesele romanilor

    1. @Casper
      Nu ma astept la efecte pe termen lung, decat daca se iau decizii de politica monetara sau fiscala in urma incidenteleor, ceea ce nu cred.
      Este adevarat ca pe termen scurt un investitor o sa astepte pana se calmeaza situatia. Dar pe termen mediu si lung conteaza mediul investitional, adica sistemul fiscal, flexibilitatea pietei fortei de munca, legea falimentului etc.

      Din punctul meu de vedere Romania trebuie sa reduca impozitele si sa prezinte un program credibil de scadere a cheltuielilor si datoriei publice. In acelasi timp BNR trebuie sa introduca lichiditate in piata interbancara la termene mai mari, pana la un an, pentru a permite creditarea economiei pe termen lung in lei.

  8. “Cred ca CHF s-ar putea sa schimbe pragul EURCHF 1.15 in loc de 1.2, cel putin pt o perioada (daca situatia din EU nu se rezolva).”

    Mie imi e greu sa cred. Dupa lovitura de imagine cauzata de demisia lui Hildebrand, asta ar fi una mult mai puternica. De asemenea, core CPI-ul YOY a ajuns la un nivel record de -1,1%, pe langa alti indicatori macro care arata slabirea economiei Elvetiei. Nici nu cred ca presiunea pe franc e acum mai mare decat a fost in momentul si inaintea interventiei, deci fara evenimente exceptionale nu vad o dificultate pentru SNB sa mentina pragul la 1.2. Iar in cazul unor evenimente exceptionale cred ca exista variante mai bune de a-ti tine banii decat in franc. Si nici pentru speculatori nu vad o oportunitate mare. In vara lui 2011, pana in toamna la interventie, a fost un crowded trade pe CHF, ceea ce nu cred ca mai e cazul acum.
    Dar, ca si contrarian, trebuie sa recunosc ca nu-mi plac deloc situatiile cu un caracter mare de certitudine. 🙂

    1. Asta este din ciclul: om trai si om vedea. Eu ma bazez pe faptul ca nu este in interesul SNB sa-si mareasca masa monetara asa la infinit si sa cumpere la schimb EUR. Pt ei este mai bine sa schimbe pragul in directia pe care o vrea piata, dar in trepte.

      De fapt , cel mai bine ar fi fost daca nu interveneau dar acum e tardiv.

      Sent from my iPhone

  9. care active credeti ca ar fi cele mai bune pentru conservarea capitalului pe perioada scurta de timp ( 1 an ) respectiv perioada lunga ( 3-5-10 ani ) ?

    1. @Mike
      Cred ca 2012 este anul activelor denominate in USD. Sunt prea multe riscuri/necunoscute in ceea ce priveste zona euro.

      Pe termen mai lung anumite tari si sectoare din zona euro arata mai bine decat SUA sau chiar EM. Ca sectoare imi plact agricol/alimentar, sector financiar dar in piete emergente si mai mult dupa 2012, Africa mi se pare interesanta pe termen mai lung.

  10. legat de ceea ce ati spus cu privire la scaderea pragului EURCHF la 1,15 : cred ca este cea mai mare greseala pe care ar putea s-o faca SNB-ul. in momentul asta sunt foarte multi traderi si foarte multe fonduri care ar intra long in apropiere de 1,2 si indirect ar da o mana de ajutor SNB-ului. si pe buna dreptate. cand ai o banca centrala ce a promis sa apere un prag aflat la doar cateva zeci de pipsi in spatele tau se merita riscul. in momentul coborarii pragului la 1,15 ar da un semnal clar ca 1,2 este nesustenabil si foarte putini ar mai avea curajul sa intre la cumparare dupa un anumit nivel (sa spunem 1,17).dimpotriva.cred ca situatia s-ar schimba radical. foarte multi ar intra short si presiunea in jos asupra cursului ar creste si mai mult(si implicit si rezervele valutare ale SNB).Oricum nimeni nu stie ce se va intampla si sunt multe variante posibile. Exact cum ati spus mai sus: om trai si om vedea

    1. desi am zis ca nu cred ca pragul de 1,20 va fi schimbat de SNB, nu cred ca traderii despre care vorbesti conteaza. traderii de retail si chiar unii mai mari, nu prea conteaza in ecuatia asta. daca ar fi dupa intentiile traderilor EURCHF ar fi acum 1.30. sunt convins ca multe hedge fund-uri mizeaza inca pe CHF si in continuare CHF-ul va fi privit ca o alternativa viabila de a-ti tine banii. plus ca nu toti care vor sa cumpere CHF sunt speculatori interesati de orice variatie. CHF-ul nu s-a intarit datorita speculatorilor ci a fundamentelor economice. e drept ca a fost un crowded trade, dar acum SNB-ul a reusit doar sa schimbe directia unui crowded trade, dar doar pentru retaileri. eu cand am zis ca SNB-ul va mentine pragul m-am bazat pe faptul ca din moment ce au intrat in hora trebuie sa joace, chiar daca interventia a fost gresita. plus ca sunt mari presiuni asupra lor din cauza ca intarirea francului afecteaza economia Elvetiei. dar problema este ca nu le va fi usor deloc sa mentina pragul, mai ales daca situatia in Europa se inrautateste, iar piata in esenta ei cu siguranta nu va fi de partea lor ci impotriva lor.

  11. sunt perfect de acord cu tine Sergiu in privinta lipsei de importanta a traderilor de retail. cel mai bun exemplu il reprezinta perechea USDJPY. m-am exprimat eu gresit. rationamentul meu se referea la toti cei care tranzactioneaza EURCHF, inclusiv hedge fund-urile. nu sunt de acord insa cu urmatoarele afirmatii: 1 . ”CHF-ul nu s-a intarit datorita speculatorilor ci a fundamentelor economice.” – oricat de puternica ar fi fost economia elvetiei nimic nu justifica o apreciere de peste 50% fata de restul valutelor in doar 3 ani. 2. ”interventia a fost gresita ” – aici s-ar putea sa fiu subiectiv (am un credit in franci) dar cred ca asta era singura solutie sa opreasca aprecierea francului. nimeni nu se mai speria de simple interventii verbale iar daca ar fi intervenit sporadic fara sa fixeze un anumit prag cred ca ar fi avut soarta BOJ-ului si dupa cateva zile sau saptamani cursul ar fi ajuns iarasi la nivelul pre-interventiei. iar la nebunia care a fost in ultimul timp cu vanzarea euro nu cred ca exagerez daca spun ca fara interventie cursul ar fi ajuns probabil pe la 0.8-0.9 .

    1. 1. nu la economia Elvetiei ma refeream cand am zis fundamente economice, ci la contextul economic global si in special cel european care au intarit statul de moneda de refugiu al francului. dimpotriva, economia Elvetiei este afectata din acest motiv.
      2. problema e ca toate interventiile se fac cu niste costuri mari, iar SNB-ul stie asta. daca nu ar fi asa, maine ar duce francul in 1.50 si gata. sau BoJ yenul in 100. nicio banca centrala, in cele din urma, nu e mai puternica decat piata. SNB-ul are un anumit noroc ca piata francului nu e atat de mare ca cea a yen-ului, insa e suficient de mare pentru a opune rezistenta. asa cum am spus, SNB-ul a intrat in meci si trebuie sa joace, dar nici pe departe nu inseamna ca deja l-a castigat. are nevoie in primul rand de un context economic favorabil, altfel toata lupta contra pietei va avea costuri imense.

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